Experience Does Justify Belief by Silins, Nicholas
	 1	
Experience Does Justify Belief 
Penultimate Draft 
Final Version in R. Neta (ed.) Current Controversies in Epistemology  
Nico Silins 
Cornell 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 When you get a good look at a ripe tomato in the market, it’s eminently rational 
for you to believe that it’s red.  And when you only get a glimpse in poor light of chalk 
on the back of your shirt, it can still be eminently rational for you to raise your level of 
confidence that something there is white.  Let’s say that in such cases, you gain 
“justification” for beliefs.  But what is the source of justification in such cases?  And 
exactly how is the justification supplied? 
 According to Fumerton in his "How Does Perception Justify Belief?", it is 
misleading or wrong to say that perception is a source of justification for such beliefs 
about the external world.  Moreover, reliability does not have an essential role to play 
here either.  I agree, and I will explain why in section 1.  A caveat though: where 
Fumerton speaks of “sensation”, I will instead speak of “experience”, having only visual 
experience in mind.  To my ear, the term “sensation” is most at home with cases of 
bodily sensation.  The visual cases we are most interested in are ones in which we have 
experiences of something or the other outside of us, or at least seem to have experiences 
of something or the other outside of us.  
 According to Fumerton, when it comes to how sensations or experiences supply 
justification, they do not do so on their own, and instead only do so only in conjunction 
with support for background beliefs about how the sensations or experiences are best 
explained.  Here I disagree.  In section 2, I will clarify the question of whether sensations 
or experiences provide justification on their own, and will respond to Fumerton’s 
arguments for his negative answer to the question.  In section 3, I will develop my main 
concern about his positive view, where that concern also brings out some of the merits of 
the view that experiences do justify beliefs about the external world on their own. 
 
1. Externalism 
 
 Fumerton and I are united in rejecting externalist views in the epistemology of 
perception.  On these views, roughly speaking, you are justified by an experience in 
believing something about the external world only if you are suitably connected to the 
truth.  On some versions, you will be unjustified if you are in a particular case of illusion 
or hallucination in which you fail to see things as they are.  On others you will be 
unjustified if you are in a case of global deception.  I am inclined to agree with 
Fumerton’s rejection of externalist views.  But I think there is much more to say in favor 
of his position than he has so far said.  In particular, the “new evil demon” problem he 
discusses has much wider ramifications than have been recognized. 
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I will focus on reliabilist views, on which your experience E gives you 
justification to believe that p just in case E is produced by a process reliably correlated 
with its being the case that p.1  Given the simple connection the view draws between 
justification and truth, the view has its attractions.  
Let’s first evaluate the proposed necessary condition for perceptual justification, 
which is standardly held to be too demanding.  Here let me review the “new evil demon 
problem” discussed by Fumerton.  Suppose an evil demon seamlessly makes someone’s 
experiences misleading most of the time.  In particular, suppose the misleading 
experiences are such that they couldn’t easily have been accurate, so that they are 
robustly not reliable.  The classic criticism is that, contrary to what reliabilism predicts, 
the victim’s experiences still give her justification for ordinary beliefs (Cohen and Lehrer 
1983, Cohen 1984, Fumerton this volume).  
 Let’s now consider the sufficient condition proposed by the reliabilist for 
perceptual justification.  This proposal is standardly held to not be demanding enough, on 
the classic grounds that an agent might be endowed with a reliable faculty of 
clairvoyance, while still failing to gain justification from the new experiences (Bonjour 
1980).  
 A difficulty with the clairvoyance objection is that it is underspecified so far.  Is 
there some sort of distinctive mental appearance that goes along with clairvoyance?   
If yes, some non-reliabilists might actually be committed to the claim that the 
clairvoyant is justified.  According to Huemer’s “phenomenal conservatism”, if it seems 
to you that p, and you have no beliefs or evidence that anything is amiss, then you have 
justification to believe that p (Huemer 2001, 2007, 2013).  Now, it will seem in a certain 
way to the clairvoyant that p, and in some cases the clairvoyant might have no reason to 
be suspicious of that appearance.  Huemer’s view would then predict the clairvoyant to 
be justified.  The prediction need not be problematic.  Compare your own situation in 
cases of “forgotten evidence”, in which something seems to you to be true, and nothing 
seems to be amiss, although you don’t have any idea of how you acquired evidence for 
the belief (Harman 1986).   
Even if the clairvoyant does not enjoy distinctive appearances, more needs to be 
said against the idea that the clairvoyant is justified.  When we consider real world 
examples of mathematical savants or chicken-sexers, some people will reckon them to be 
justified, whether or not their capacities of judgment come along with distinctive 
appearances.2  Why not reckon clairvoyants to be justified as well? 
 We actually do not need to refine the clairvoyance cases to argue against the 
reliabilist sufficiency thesis.  The evil demon example will do, and indeed will do better.  
 The severe predicament of the victim enables a stronger objection to reliabilism 
about perceptual justification.  Here it is crucial that her experiences are robustly not 
reliable.  When her experiences are misleading with respect to an ordinary belief that p, 
then, they are actually reliable with respect to the negation of the belief that p.  
Reliabilism as formulated so far predicts that the victim has justification to deny ordinary 
beliefs, it does not merely predict that she lacks justification to accept ordinary beliefs.  																																																								
1 For a recent defense of a view in this vicinity, see Goldman (2008). 
2 For a blushingly vivid description of how chicken-sexers do their work, see Foer (2011: 
ch. 3). 
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Even if you are willing to maintain that she lacks justification to believe that she has 
hands, it is harder to maintain that she has justification to believe she doesn’t have hands. 
The evil demon problem can be strengthened in two further ways. 
   First consider that the victim has reliable access to what experiences she is having 
(at least when these experiences are not construed as success states of genuine 
perceiving).  In a given situation she will know that it visually seems to her that p.  
Indeed, in such a case her experience will be reliable with respect to the true conjunction 
that [it’s not the case that p and it visually seems to her that p].  Thus, if reliabilism is 
correct, she will be able to get justification to believe that her experience is misleading! 
 Second, consider the “bootstrapping” problem for reliabilism, discussed by 
Fumerton 1995, Vogel 2000, and Cohen 2002. Let me first set out the objection as it 
arises in an everyday case, in which someone’s experiences are reliable with respect to 
what they represent.  The objection is that, if reliabilism is true, it looks like one’s 
experiences can end up themselves giving one justification to believe that they are 
reliable.  The experiences threaten to do so if one forms a series of justified beliefs to the 
effect that “p and it visually seems to me that p”, and then inductively generalizes from 
those beliefs to conclude that one’s experiences are reliable.   
Here it might be tempting to bite the bullet, as Van Cleve 2003, Bergmann 2004, 
and Kornblith 2009 in effect do.  We plausibly can have justification to believe that our 
experiences are reliable, and unless the domain of a priori justification is greatly 
expanded, how else would we get it?  Given that there arguably is no plausible view 
about how we can have justification to believe that our experiences are reliable, it is 
perhaps not outrageous to allow bootstrapping as a source of such justification. 
 The evil demon case allows us to present a much worse instance of the 
bootstrapping problem.  If reliabilism is true, it looks like the victim’s experiences can 
end up giving her justification to believe that they are unreliable with respect to what 
they represent.  The experiences threaten to do so if she forms a series of beliefs to the 
effect that “it’s not the case that p and it visually seems to me that p”, and then 
inductively generalizes to the conclusion that her experiences are unreliable with respect 
to what they represent.  Here it is much harder to bite the bullet. 
Let me now consider several possible responses on behalf of reliabilists, 
responses which are tailored to the argument I have set out (for valuable more general 
discussion of bootstrapping, see Weisberg 2010). 
First, the reliabilist might say one gains a justified belief from an experience only 
when one takes the experience at face value, so that an experience as of something there’s 
being green cannot justify one in believing the negation of the proposition. However, 
there is reason to reject the addition to the theory, since experiences arguably can justify 
one in believing one has them, without yet representing that one has them. In any case, 
since experiences can have reliable connections to subject matters which outstrip their 
content, it’s unprincipled for a reliabilist to make the addition to the view. For example, 
the reliabilist perspective should allow that experiences of smoke can justify beliefs 
concerning fire.  
Second, one might try to refine simple reliabilism in the following causal terms: 
your experience of type E gives you justification to believe that p just in case tokens of E 
are reliably caused by its being the case that p. Given that the experiences of the victim 
of the evil demon are not caused by its failing to be the case that p, the new proposal does 
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not predict that the victim has justification to reject the contents of her experience. The 
new proposal however is too demanding. Suppose that some of our beliefs about what 
mental states we are in are not caused by those mental states, but are instead constituted 
by the mental states, so that it is impossible to have the beliefs without being in the 
relevant mental states (cf. Chalmers 2003; Horgan and Kriegel 2007). The reliabilist 
shouldn’t forbid such a non-causal connection from conferring justification, but the new 
proposal does just that. (One might respond by advancing a disjunctive version of the 
reliabilist proposal, but I take the move to be ad hoc). 
In the final response I will consider, reliabilists might maintain that the victim has 
defeating evidence which prevents her from having justification to believe that nothing 
there is green. She after all might seem to receive ample testimony that something there is 
green. The problem with this response is that it conflicts with the reliabilist position. 
Given the unreliability of the apparent testimony she receives, a reliabilist shouldn’t give 
it the power to defeat. 
By the lights of the evil demon, the victim has no justification to believe that her 
experiences are misleading.  If reliabilism is true, however, it looks like the demon is 
deluded.  Biting the bullet here is not an option.  Evil demons cannot be foiled with such 
ease.  
The “new evil demon problem” for reliabilism isn’t just that reliabilism predicts 
the absence of justification for ordinary beliefs in the case.  The problem is that, without 
further refinement, reliabilism predicts the presence of justification for the negations of 
ordinary beliefs, and the presence of justification to believe that experience is unreliable. 
 
2. Basicness 
 
Fumerton and I agree that experience, in the absence of perception, sometimes 
justifies belief.  Experience does so in some cases of illusion, or hallucination, and even 
radical deception.  What we disagree about is how experience justifies belief.  In 
particular, does experience ever justify belief by itself?  Fumerton thinks the answer to 
the question is “no”.  I say “yes”. 
Let me start by clarifying the question and the commitments of answers to it.  I’ll 
then articulate Fumerton’s arguments for his negative answer, and respond to them. 
To formulate the present question about how experience justifies belief, first 
consider a contrast case.  Suppose you get a good look outside in the morning at the snow 
in your empty street, and form a belief that it’s likely that someone is shoveling in the 
neighbourhood.  No one should say that your experience justifies that belief on its own---
you didn’t experience anyone outside at all!  Instead, what makes you justified in forming 
that belief is your experience and your having independent reason to hold an appropriate 
linking belief, e.g to the effect that if there’s snow outside in the morning, it’s likely that 
someone is shoveling in the neighbourhood.  Let’s say that, in cases like this, your 
experience gives you “non-basic” justification for a belief.  On Fumerton’s view, 
experiences only ever give us non-basic justification for beliefs about the external world.  
Whenever an experience gives us justification to believe something about the external 
world, it’s doing so only jointly with our having independent reason for further beliefs.       
For a contrasting example of “basic justification”, consider how a sharp pain can 
justify you in believing that you are in pain.  Here your pain gives you justification to 
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believe you are in pain, in a way that does not happen only in conjunction with your 
having independent reason to hold any further beliefs.  On the basic justification view I 
defend, experiences sometimes give us basic justification for beliefs about the external 
world.  They sometimes give justification for beliefs about the external world, in a way 
that does not happen only in conjunction with our having independent reason for further 
beliefs.   
The crucial question for basic justification is about the role of having justification 
for further beliefs.  The question actually does not concern whether your experiences 
suffice for having justification from them for beliefs about the external world.  Even if 
experiences provide basic justification, they might need an appropriately reliable 
connection to the external world, or to be appropriately free from influence by our own 
expectations and desires, or to meet further requirements which are not formulated in 
terms of background beliefs.  So the view that experiences provide basic justification is 
not committed to anything as strong as Huemer’s “phenomenal conservatism”.  That 
view might well be too demanding, but the basic justification view does not make such a 
demand.3   
Finally, the basic justification view is not committed to foundationalism, as Pryor 
(2000) points out.  Foundationalism is a view about the overall structure of the 
justification of our beliefs about the external world.  It says roughly that, for any belief b 
about the external world that is justified but not basicly justified, b’s justification is 
traceable to that of some basicly justified belief (e.g. Bonjour 1985).  One need not hold 
this view about the overall structure of justification to hold that some beliefs have basic 
justification from experiences.  You could combine the basic justification view with some  
coherentist story about the justification of other beliefs about the external world.4 
 Having clarified the question of whether experiences ever provide basic 
justification for beliefs about the external world, let me now turn to Fumerton’s central 
arguments for the conclusion that they don’t.   
 One important argument is based on what it takes to have the concepts which 
figure in external world beliefs.  The starting point is the thought that, in order to have a 
concept of the external world, one must make assumptions about the external world in 
order to have it.  For example, perhaps one has a concept of a stable color only if one 
assumes that the color of a thing can remain constant while the things appears differently 
in different viewing conditions (Fumerton, this volume).  Further, these assumptions 																																																								
3 The view thereby also avoids recent challenges in terms of “cognitive penetration” 
(Markie 2005, Siegel 2012, Vance forthcoming).  For example, if Jack looks angry to you 
merely because you had a unjustified belief that he is angry, then perhaps your 
experience fails to give you reason to believe that he is angry.  Be that as it may, the basic 
justification view does not entail that the experience does give you reason to believe that 
he is angry, since the view proposes no sufficient condition for getting justification from 
an experience. 
4 The basic justification view is also not a solution to skeptical problems.  A proper 
response to skepticism needs to articulate the best arguments for skepticism, and to 
explain where they go wrong, and perhaps even why they seemed to go right.  The basic 
justification view by itself does none of these things.   
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presumably must be justified for particular applications of the concept to be justified.  
But the requirements for concept possession might then seem to rule out the view that 
experiences sometimes give us basic justification. 
I’ll sketch the argument using Fumerton’s example of the concept red, while 
remaining schematic about what it takes exactly to have the concept: 
 
The Concept Possession Argument 
 
(1) If one has the concept red, then for some proposition that p one presupposes that p in 
applying red on the basis of experience. 
(2) If one presupposes that p in applying red on the basis of experience, then one is 
justified in applying red on the basis of experience only if one has independent reason to 
believe that p. 
(3) If one is justified in applying red on the basis of experience only if one has 
independent reason to believe that p, then an experience never justifies one in applying 
red on its own, but instead only in conjunction with one’s having independent reason to 
believe that p. 
So, 
(4) An experience never justifies one in applying red on its own, but instead only in 
conjunction with one’s having independent reason to believe that p. 
 
 I have several points to make in response. 
 First, even if the argument succeeds for the case of red, it’s not clear how the 
template will work for all beliefs about the external world.  Suppose someone forms a 
very minimal belief on the basis of experience, to the effect that that is there, leaving 
open the details of what that is and where it is.  It’s not clear to me whether any 
presuppositions need to be made in order to have such thin concepts (if some very 
general presuppositions do need to be made, they may simply figure in experience as well 
as discussed in the paragraph below).  The threat so far is that experience will still be able 
to justify some beliefs about the external world.  Such beliefs may be too thin to serve as 
an adequate foundation for the rest of our beliefs about the external world, but that again 
is a different matter.  The basic justification view is not committed to foundationalism, so 
it does not have to answer “the formidable question of how we could even get a robust 
enough foundation out of internal states” (Fumerton, this volume, page 45).”  
 Second, against premise (2), even if a presupposition needs to be made in order to 
apply the concept red, it may be that the presupposition is appropriately reflected in 
experience itself, so that no independent reason to believe is required.  For instance, 
Fumerton emphasizes the fact that red things can have different appearances in different 
viewing conditions.  He takes this to threaten the ability of experiences to justify 
ascriptions of color without the assistance of further beliefs, because we need to have the 
presupposition in place that red things which acquire a different appearance in new 
viewing conditions are still red.  But now consider what science says about color 
constancy5.  The consensus view seems to be that red things still look red in a wide range 
of viewing conditions, as when a partially shaded Corvette still uniformly looks to be red 																																																								
5 For an overview, see Burge (2010). 
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rather than two-toned.  If color experience itself delivers the verdict that the Corvette is 
uniformly red, it’s not clear why outside presuppositions must be playing any essential 
role in the justification of the belief that the car is uniformly red.  On Fumerton’s picture, 
something from the outside must correct for the misleading appearance of the object, but 
color vision doesn’t seem to be in need of any such correction.  There is room for us so 
far to be justified in believing that the object is uniformly red by taking the experience at 
face value. 
 Third, it is in any case unclear whether presuppositions must be in place for to 
deliver verdicts about uniform color.  Color experience seems to deliver the verdict that 
the car is uniformly red regardless of what background beliefs you have, or regardless of 
what independent reason you have for background beliefs.  So even premise (1) needs 
further defense here. 
 Finally, it’s not clear to me how to justify premise (3).  Even if having 
independent reason for a certain belief is a necessary condition for the possession of a 
concept, it’s not clear why that should prevent experience from providing basic 
justification for an application of the concept.  For instance, one arguably has the concept 
red only if one has (non-perceptual) reason to believe the triviality that red things are red, 
but surely that fact does not get in the way of experiences to provide justification for 
applications of red.  Or, one arguably has the concept red only if one has had color 
experience, but that fact presumably does not get in the way of having a priori 
justification for some beliefs using the concept, such as the belief that red things are red.6  
Here experience supplies a necessary condition for having the concept, without figuring 
in the justification of a certain use of the concept.  More needs to be said explain why the 
requirement for concept possession laid down in premise (2) prohibits getting basic 
justification for an application of the concept.       
 It may be that some revision of Fumerton’s argument avoids all these concerns, 
but I’m not sure what it is. 
 I take there to be a related but different argument in Fumerton’s discussion, one 
which brings in considerations about the fallibility of the connection between experience 
and belief.7  This argument is articulated when Fumerton writes that 
 
. . . everyone, at some level, realizes that round things don’t always look round, that 
rough surfaces don’t always feel rough, and that sour things don’t always taste sour.  But 
once one realizes that there is a “gap” between appearance and reality, it is not hard for 
the skeptic to exploit that gap and demand some reason to suppose that the beliefs about 
reality formed on the basis of appearance are likely to be true (this volume, p. 49). 
 
The core thought here is that, given that appearances are sometimes misleading, one 
needs independent reason to believe they are non-misleading in order to gain justification 
from them.  Some intermediate belief is needed to “bridge the gap” between appearance 																																																								
6 See Kitcher (1980) and Burge (1993). 
7 There are further arguments out there as well.  One involves the bootstrapping 
considerations mentioned earlier.  For a response, see Cohen (2010) or Wedgwood 
(forthcoming).  Another involves considerations from probability theory, see White 
(2006) for the argument and Silins (2008), Willenken (2011) or Pryor (2013) for 
responses. 
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and reality.  Call this the “demand for a bridge”.  We can formulate it and the larger 
argument as follows: 
 
The Gap Argument 
 
(5) Whenever it visually seems to you that p, it’s possible for it to visually seem to you 
that p when it’s not the case that p.   
(6) If it’s possible for it to visually seem to you that p when it’s not the case that p, your 
experience gives you justification to believe that p only in conjunction with your having 
independent reason to reject the error hypothesis that [it visually seems to you that p 
when it’s not the case that p]. 
So, 
(7) Whenever it visually seems to you that p, your experience gives you justification to 
believe that p only in conjunction with your having independent reason to reject the error 
hypothesis that [it visually seems to you that p when it’s not the case that p] 
 
 My first response is that, as before, there are complications in arguing that 
experience never provides basic justification for beliefs about the external world.  One 
example comes from the sort of content externalist Fumerton discusses in his note 7.  
Suppose I get a good look at a bird outside, and it visually seems to me that that exists.  
According to the sort of externalist Fumerton has in mind, things can seem that way to 
me only if the object in question does exist.  But then we’ll have a counterexample to 
premise 5, and the demand for a bridge won’t apply.  Another complication is raised by 
the possibility of self-directed perceptual content.  Suppose I get a good look at myself in 
a mirror, and it visually seems to me that I exist, or that Nico exists.  Things couldn’t 
visually appear to me in any way whatsoever unless those propositions are true.  So we 
again have a potential counterexample to premise 5 where the demand for a bridge won’t 
apply.  
 The examples above are no doubt controversial.  Let me set aside further debate 
about them aside and now turn to my main line of response.  The demand for a bridge is 
important and influential, but I think much more needs to be said in favor of it.  Most 
importantly, in order for Fumerton to appeal to the demand, he needs to show that it 
doesn’t simply lead to skepticism.  The challenge here is to find a bridging belief that 
does not itself generate a need for a further bridging belief.   
To see how the threat arises, think back to your counterpart who is a victim of an 
evil demon.  Suppose that you are justified by x in rejecting the error hypothesis.  This 
amounts to being justified by x in having the bridge belief that [if it visually seems you 
that p, then p].  Setting aside complications involving the terms “you” and “I”, on the 
internalist approach taken by Fumerton, your counterpart will be as justified as you, also 
by x, in having the bridging belief.  But in the case of your radically deceived 
counterpart, the bridging belief is false!  It visually seems to your counterpart that p while 
it actually fails to be that case that p.  So now it turns out that there is a gap between x 
and the truth of the bridging belief.  If we accept the demand for a bridge, we will need 
something to bridge this new gap.  That is, since x is consistent with the falsehood of the 
bridging belief, we will need a further reason to reject the hypothesis that x obtains while 
the bridging belief is false.  Now, for any further candidate we find, that candidate will be 
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equally available to your deceived counterpart, on Fumerton’s internalist approach.  It’s 
not clear how any gap between appearance and reality will ultimately be bridged. 
 The challenge laid out above involves a bridging belief that is false in the case of 
deception.  In response to the challenge, one might point out that Fumerton could appeal 
to a bridging belief that is true.8  For example, perhaps on a suitably epistemic 
understanding of probability, the victim of the evil demon has the true bridging belief that 
it visually seems to her that p only if it probably is the case that p.  But now we need to 
consider how one could be justified in having the new bridging belief.  Suppose you are 
justified by y in having it.  If y is not supposed to guarantee the truth of the new bridging 
belief, we again face the challenge outlined above, where we need a new reason to prefer 
the conjunction of y and the new bridging belief to the conjunction of y and the negation 
of the new bridging belief.  If y instead is supposed to guarantee the truth of the new 
bridging belief, we need a story about how such a special reason is to be found.  
Fumerton’s own discussion of how a bridging belief might be justified, discussed in 
further detail below, is in terms of an inference to the best explanation.  Inference to the 
best explanation is normally not a source of support for a conclusion which guarantees 
the truth of the conclusion.  So it’s not clear how a bridging belief is found that doesn’t 
need its own bridging belief.  In general, whenever a reason R is offered that fails to 
guarantee the truth of the conclusion C it is supposed to support, we will need a further 
reason to prefer [R and C] to [R and not-C].  It’s not clear how we’ll ever find a reason 
that guarantees the truth of the needed conclusion.9 
 Fumerton’s second argument has the potential to show that our experiences never 
give us basic justification for external world beliefs.  It also threatens to show that our 
experiences never give us any kind of justification for external world beliefs.   
 
3. Evaluation of Fumerton’s positive view 
 
Having responded to Fumerton’s arguments against what happens to be my view, 
let me turn to evaluating his own view. 
According to Fumerton, experiences do provide non-basic justification for beliefs 
about the external world, thanks to the availability of an inference to the best explanation 
of facts about experience by facts about the external world.  Here I will leave open the 
question of exactly how the explanation is meant to go, and of why it should be the best, 
better than any skeptical alternative.  I will focus on what I take to be the main problem 
for Fumerton’s view (where an advantage of the basic justification view is that it avoids 
the problem). 																																																								
8 Thanks here to Matt Frise, Richard Fumerton, and Declan Smithies. 9	A further possibility here is that the appropriate bridging belief of yours is justified, but 
not justified by anything.  Perhaps the demand for a bridge only applies when a belief is 
justified by something, and so does not apply in this case.  Although this is an option 
available in theoretical space here, I don’t see any reason to believe it.  
Another option would be to claim that the appropriate bridging belief is itself a necessary 
truth, not false in any situation.  This option has a better prospect of removing the 
demand for a bridge, but I don’t see any reason to believe that there is a necessary truth to 
play the appropriate role.  
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My major concern about Fumerton’s position is that it threatens to “over 
intellectualize” what it takes for experience to justify belief (Burge 2003 is a standard 
exposition of this sort of concern).  We can make the concern concrete with an example.  
Consider a young child or an unreflecting adult, who gets a good look at the Sesame 
Street character Elmo in a book, and who forms the belief that that is red without further 
ado.  In forming the belief, they certainly do not consciously draw on beliefs about the 
reliability of their experience, or about the best explanation of their experience.  In the 
case of the child, she does not even have the concepts required to form beliefs about the 
reliability of her experience, or the best explanation of her experience.  So it’s not clear 
how the inference to the best explanation promoted by Fumerton is even available to her.  
However, the child and adult are plausibly both justified in forming and in holding the 
belief that that is red.  It is not clear how Fumerton’s outlined account could allow for 
this, given the heavy demands it seems to impose for having justified perceptual beliefs. 
 In response, one might claim that the child’s beliefs are unjustified, as does 
Bonjour (1978).  This response seems too harsh to me.  Consider another child who sees 
Elmo in equally good environmental conditions, with no background information about 
anything going wrong, who nevertheless suspends judgment about whether that is red.  
The suspicious child’s suspension of judgment seems to be unjustified, and the ordinary 
child’s belief positively seems to be justified.  
 In another response, one might insist that what goes for the child does not go for 
the adult.  As Schechter (2013) puts it in a different context, one might invoke a 
“Spiderman principle” in epistemology, according to which greater conceptual power 
brings along greater epistemic responsibility, and higher standards for justification.  
Given that the child cannot even form beliefs about the reliability or best explanation of 
her experiences, there are less requirements for her to form justified perceptual beliefs.  
In the case of the adult, who does have the concepts required to form such beliefs, more 
is required.   
A problem with the line of response is that it might still be too demanding.  We 
can bring out the problem by focusing on what it takes to have a “well founded” or 
“doxastically justified” belief.10  Having a belief with that status is a matter of properly 
using the epistemic resources one has rather than merely having reason to hold a belief.  
To use a standard example, Holmes and Watson might the same reasons to hold a belief, 
where only Holmes makes proper use of the reasons he has in forming that belief, so that 
only Holmes ends up with a belief that is well founded.  Now, in the case of unreflecting 
adults, they arguably have not formed requisite beliefs about the reliability or best 
explanation of their experiences, and at any rate do not recruit such meta-cognitive 
beliefs in the process of the formation of their everyday perceptual beliefs.  So it’s not 
clear how Fumerton’s account allows even for ordinary adults to have well founded 
perceptual beliefs.   
In response, one might say that metacognitive beliefs are somehow implicitly 
involved in adult perceptual belief formation.  It is not clear to me whether they even play 
an implicit role.  It is striking here that even the expert theorist has not yet articulated the 
metacognitive beliefs, suggesting that they are not even implicitly held by the ordinary 																																																								
10 I develop this challenge in my (2008).  For some recent discussion of the challenge, see 
Silva (2013). 
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subject, and again at any rate aren’t playing a basing role with the ordinary subject.  If 
Fumerton and other theorists did have the relevant beliefs implicitly, presumably they 
shouldn’t be so hard to articulate.  So the threat remains that justified perceptual beliefs 
are predicted to be unjustified by Fumerton’s approach. 
 Finally, there is a further way to press the worry about over-intellectualization, 
one which draws directly on Fumerton’s own discussion.  It thereby promises to avoid a 
risk of simply talking past him, where I would be using a different, less demanding 
concept of “justification” than his own.  Since we are drawing on his own discussion 
here, we presumably are using the same concept expressed by “justification” as him.  To 
see the worry, reconsider how Fumerton ultimately formulates the “evil demon problem” 
for externalist views.  As he puts it: 
 
Consider the following propositions: 
1) I have a phenomenally rich life of sensations and  apparent memories (these can be 
laboriously described so that the experiences have the same intrinsic character as do 
yours). 
2) These are caused directly by a powerful, malevolent being (and similar sensations have 
always been caused in like fashion). 
3) I form beliefs whose content describes a physical environment (the kind of beliefs you 
form about your physical environment). 
 
Does the conjunction of 1), 2) and 3) entail  
4) I have epistemically justified beliefs[?] (this volume, p. 44) 
Like Fumerton, I think that the answer to the question is yes!  But notice how meta-
cognitively thin the base is that is supposed to entail 4.  We are indeed told that the 
subject has a rich fabric of experience, as well as beliefs about an external world.  But we 
are not told about the availability of beliefs about the reliability or best explanation of her 
experience.  The entailment still seems to go through.  Given that it seems to go through, 
the requirements imposed by Fumerton’s suggested account again seem to be over-
intellectualized.  And here they arguably seem that way even by his own lights.   
 Fumerton’s view seems to make it too hard for experience to justify beliefs about 
the external world, by making heavy intellectual demands of the subject.  Since the basic 
justification view does not make such demands, it has a significant advantage here over 
Fumerton’s view.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 How does perception justify belief?  Strictly speaking, perception doesn’t justify 
belief.  Experience does.  So far Fumerton and I are not in disagreement.  I have simply 
tried to provide further considerations against the externalist views we both oppose.   
Fumerton and I are in disagreement about whether experience ever justifies 
external world belief on its own, in a way that is basic.  I hope to have shown that 
Fumerton’s arguments against my view fail, and I hope to have shown that my view has a 
significant advantage over his own.   
What exactly makes it possible for experience to provide basic justification?  And 
how are we to account for the achievement of full-blown knowledge of the external 
	 12	
world?  These are further questions, ones that require their own contemporary debates in 
epistemology.11   
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